The Hyping of Hawke 2

Here's Paul Kelly's version of the late former PM Hawke's contribution to the Gulf War (August 1990 - February 1991), otherwise known as Operation Desert Shield:

"In early 1991 after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, Hawke authorised Australia's most important military commitment since Vietnam. For Hawke, the argument was irrefutable - it was a repelling [of] aggression, it involved support for the alliance since US President George H W Bush was spearheading the action; but, more decisively, it meant support for the UN authorised position. In November 1990 the Security Council passed its 'war resolution' approving 'all necessary means' to reverse the invasion. Australia's contribution was a modest three ships. Hawke had considered five but, worried about casualties, opted for caution. For the Labor Party and the Left - still shaped by the Vietnam experience - this was a turning point. Many feared a disaster but the war was short and successful. While Australia's contribution was small, the significance of the decision was great - the nation had moved beyond the psychology of Vietnam." (Lover, fighter & peacemaker, The Australian, 17/5/19)

Needless to say, Kelly's is a caricature of the reality, designed solely to burnish the image of St Bob. The following data has been culled from The Case Against Australian Participation by Janet Powell & Richard Bolt, in Australia's Gulf War (1992). (Powell was the parliamentary leader of the Australian Democrats, 1990-91.) I set it out here by way of rebutting each of Kelly's propaganda points in the order in which they are raised:

Saddam's alleged "defiance of UNSC resolutions":

"In fact Iraq had in several statements demonstrated sufficient realism to comprehend that it would have to withdraw for the crisis to end. Its recent history shows reversals of apparently intractable positions as the pressure of circumstances demanded; for example, in handing back territory won from Iran during their recent war... This was clear from a leaked UN transcript of Secretary-General [Peres] de Cuellar's 13 January meeting with President Saddam Hussein, in a last minute bid to avert war. Despite public claims that the Iraqi leader had refused to even discuss withdrawing the transcript reveals that President Hussein 'produced a map of Kuwait and asked... 'Where should Iraq withdraw to?' But he also said that open discussion of withdrawal 'as war was looming' would be damaging to him. Contrary to the rhetoric of war advocates, a negotiated settlement backed by sanctions would not have required that Iraq be appeased with unprincipled enticements to withdraw. Assurances could have been given that withdrawal, payment of compensation, and the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction would be followed by increased efforts to convene a Middle East peace conference, and agreement that the World Court should adjudicate on Iraq's claims over the disputed Rumaila oilfield on its border with Kuwait... Such assurances were ruled out simply to reduce the prospects of success in the contrived eleventh hour-hour negotiations initiated by the United States." (p 32-3)

"It was a repelling of aggression":

"The Australian Government justified its commitment of naval forces as a contribution to the enforcement of sanctions, which it claimed could not be effective without policing. However, other successful sanctions regimes, such as that against South Africa, were not enforced. And the multi-national naval task force in the Gulf was far larger than needed for enforcement... In fact, the predominantly US naval force was structured from the outset to give the Bush Administration the option of launching war against Iraq. It was based on Operation Plan 90-1002', an existing contingency plan for an oil war in the Middle East... Sanctions enforcement was thus a convenient pretext for deploying warships in anticipation of war." (pp 29-30)

"It meant support for the UN authorised position":

"The US-led blockade usurped the Security Council, which has the power to authorize a blockade where sanctions 'have proved to be inadequate'. The UN Charter requires that the military forces contributed to a blockade by member countries be subject to the 'strategic direction' of the Council's Military Staff Committee. Because sanctions had not proved to be inadequate, with diplomatic pressure serving an effective means of sanctions enforcement, and to avoid the shackles of the Military Staff Committee's control, the Bush Administration bypassed the United Nations by citing Section 51 of the UN Charter, which upholds nations' right of collective self-defence. President Bush obtained an invitation from the Emir of Kuwait to impose a blockade in defence of his country. Prime Minister Hawke fully supported the United States by announcing on 10 August that Australia's deployment of two warships and a supply vessel was primarily to 'enforce the blockade on Iraq and Kuwait'. But no request for Australian help had been received from the Emir of Kuwait (it arrived some time later) and no blockade had been approved by the Security Council. This was such a blatant breach of the UN Charter that it was later disowned by Senator [Gareth] Evans. After weeks of wrangling, the Security Council finally gave its retrospective blessing for the sanctions to be enforced by those countries that were already doing so. However, its Military Staff Committee was not placed in overall command; this was a US, not a UN blockade." (p 30)

"The advocates of war cited Security Council Resolution 678 as evidence that this was a UN war, consistent with its Charter's provisions for military action. But 678 was worded to leave all decisions on the war... to the US. The Security council had simply rubber-stamped a decision of the Bush Administration. As UN Secretary-General Peres de Cuellar said as his alarm at the loss of life grew, 'This is not a United Nations war'." (pp 36-37)

"The war was short and successful":

"The pre-war suffering of Iraqi civilians was magnified economically by the war, as the [US-led] coalition systematically bombed Iraq's civil infrastructure: power stations, water purification plants, communications facilities, roads and bridges. Thousands died from the direct effect of the blasts - homes, hospitals, markets, mosques... were incidentally destroyed - and many more from the resultant collapse of health and transport services, the loss of clean water, and food shortages. The most authoritative estimate so far is that 9,000 to 21,000 Iraqi civilians died from the effects of the war. The resultant civil uprising crushed by the Iraqi leadership left 20,000 Iraqis dead, with another 15,000 to 30,000 refugees dying on the road or in camps. The war 'resulted in the largest movement of people in the shortest amount of time in any modern war', as millions fled their homes. The civilian death toll is mounting as normally treatable diseases - diarrhoea (causing infant death from dehydration), typhoid, gastroenteritis, hepatitis, meningitis, polio and cholera - sweep the country. A Harvard University team estimates that 170,000 Iraqi children will die from the after-effects of the war.... Finally, the slaughter of Iraq's armed forces raises serious humanitarian questions. Some 100,000 to 120,000 perished with half dying in the last few days, many while retreating to Iraq. They were mostly a dictator's conscripts who faced execution for deserting, and whose lives could have been spared by reliance on sanctions." (pp 34-36)

Then there's this uncritical, almost casual assertion of Kelly's that deserves attention: "The nation had moved beyond the psychology of Vietnam." The nation had moved, or Hawke had moved? Was this necessarily a good, or a bad thing? Should not the lessons to e learnt from of our uncritical and overzealous involvement in Vietnam have been uppermost in the mind of any prime minister worth his salt, let alone in that of a Labor prime minister? All of these matters are, of course, bypassed in Kelly's hagiographical account. More broadly, could it not be said of Hawke that, by involving Australia in America's first assault on Iraq, he helped pave the way for Liberal prime minister John Howard to involve Australia in America's war on Iraq in 2003?

Finally, just to highlight Hawke's (and Bush senior's) hypocrisy on this matter, consider these pertinent words of Powell's:

"This was not a war which saw the United Nations at last fulfill its Charter, free of Cold War shackles, but one in which the United Nations was hijacked by the United States in pursuit of largely national interests and in violation of the spirit of the UN Charter. Contrary to Mr Hawke's claim, this was not a war which carried a message that big nations cannot invade small ones and get away with it. Syria is still in Lebanon, Israel is tightening its grip over the Occupied Territories, the United States has not renounced its unlawful invasion of Panama, Indonesia's annexation of East Timor remains appeased by the United States and Australia, Turkey still occupies Cyprus, China is in Tibet, and so on. None of these countries are under threat of sanctions, let alone war, despite numerous UN resolutions which have not been complied with. The Gulf War was an oil-based exception to this pattern of appeasement." (p 38)

To be continued...