The figure of the recently deceased (16/5/19) former Australian Labor Party PM Bob Hawke, has, of course, been weaponised by the new neoliberal Liberal Party government led by Evangelical/Christian Zionist PM Scott Morrison for use against the Labor Party opposition led by Anthony Albanese.
But the former PLO ambassador to Australia, Ali Kazak, portrays a very different former Labor PM.
Written for the Pearls & Irritations website (johnmenadue.com), Kazak introduces himself as "an expert on Australian-Arab relations and affairs, and author of Australia and the Arabs (in Arabic), and editor of the book Jerusalem Reader: From Occupation to City of Peace (2019) (in English).
Hawke's prime ministership lasted from 1983-1991, and Kazak describes a very different Bob Hawke to the one appropriated by the present government and its supporters, one who'd transcended his blind support for Israel while president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) from 1969-1980:
"Bob Hawke was long known as a great friend of Israel, but in his years after retiring from Parliament, I came to know him as a person increasingly concerned about Palestinian rights and getting a fair peace deal for Palestinians and Israelis. Then, as Palestinian ambassador and head of delegation, we developed over the last 25 years a decent friendship; we would share a cigar on the balcony of his Northbridge house overlooking the harbour, where most of our meetings took place, discussing and working on specific issues of concern. Bob used to express immense frustration and disappointment not only with the Israeli government's persistent human rights violations but of Palestinians but also with the United States' blind eye and lack of commitment to a just peace.
"Building on Gough Whitlam's implementation of an even-handed policy towards the Israeli-Arab conflict in 1972, Bob Hawke's government reviewed Australia's Middle East policy. The review announced by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden on 30 September 1983 recognised the central importance of the Palestinian issue for any settlement, a role for the Palestine Liberation Organisation in any peace process and acknowledged the the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. It also called on Israel to freeze its settlement program in the 1967-occupied territories, because the settlements are 'contrary to international law and a significant and a significant obstacle to peace efforts'. At the time this was a more advanced position than many European countries.
"Following the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in 1987 and the PLO initiative in November 1988, Hawke's government recognised the PLO in March 1989.
"In a speech celebrating former Soviet refuseniks in Melbourne on 17 May 1988, Bob compared the struggle of the Palestinian people with the Jews in the Soviet Union and the blacks in South Africa, saying 'The Palestinian in the occupied territories, as the Jew in the Soviet Union and the black in South Africa has his aspirations to be fully free.' A point he stressed again, decades later, in an article he wrote for the Australian Financial Review, titled Time to recognise the state of Palestine, on 14 February 2017.
"From the early days of Benjamin Netanyahu's prime ministership of Israel, Bob realised that Netanyahu was not part of the solution, telling me in 1996 that 'This f...ing Netanyahu does not want peace'.
"The Guardian reported Hawke as saying, 'I think that President Obama has been inadequate in terms of using his influence and that of the United States in trying to bring together the Israelis and Palestinians'.
"When all Arab governments agreed to a peace initiative at the Beirut Summit of the Arab League in March 2002, Israel not only responded by refusing the Arab peace initiative, but its prime minister General Ariel Sharon's response to the Arabs' outstretched hand for peace was to order his army to reoccupy Palestinian cities and surround and bombard President Arafat's headquarters.
"Bob was furious; he expressed to me his wish to break the siege and go and meet with Arafat and asked me to arrange that; and despite the wrath and rejection of of the Israeli government he met with Arafat on 24 September 2003.
"From then onwards, Bob worked hard and travelled around the world to gain Australian, American, European and Asian support for an economic plan to help build the palestinian economy, similar to the Marshall Plan. He spoke with John Howard, Alexander Downer, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schrodor of Germany, and many others.
"He also tried to build a technical school in Gaza as a gift from the Australian people to the Palestinians to help them rebuild their economy, in which the ACTU would organise volunteer technicians and teachers. The project was supported by the Palestinian Authority which allocated land that was inspected by deputy prime minister Tim Fischer during a visit to Palestine in March 1997, but the Howard government would not provide the $5m needed for the school.
"Ahead of Benjamin Netanyahu's 2017 visit to Australia, Bob called on the Australian government to recognise the state of Palestine in an article published in the Australian Financial Review. He wrote: 'Australia was there at the very beginning. The least we can do now, in these most challenging of times, is to do what 137 other nations have already done - grant diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine'."
Showing posts with label Gough Whitlam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gough Whitlam. Show all posts
Sunday, June 23, 2019
Friday, October 24, 2014
Gough Whitlam: To PLO or Not to PLO 3
"The next speaker was Lionel Murphy. He opposed the final position put by Gough and reminded Cabinet of the decision taken to force the Australian Wheat Board to honour its contract to supply wheat to Egypt on credit. He said that had we not stood by correct principles then, we would not have escaped the consequences of the energy crisis as we did. It never pays in the long run, he said, to forsake principles, and in this case, we had people who, so far as we knew, were law-abiding citizens merely wanting to come to our country to put the case for the Palestinians. It didn't matter, he argued, whether we were for or against that case, justice demanded that they be given a chance to put their case to the Australian people. He said it didn't matter how Whitlam's final decision was dressed up, it was discrimination based on political expediency and would not stand the test of history. He concluded by saying he supported my case without qualification.
"It was a splendid defence of our position and had a vote been taken straight after Murphy's speech we would have won! I was now quite confident of winning, but I was not to know that Willesee would follow Whitlam and ask Cabinet to reject his own proposition. I half suspected that something was amiss because Willesee had leaned over to whisper something to Whitlam which caused him to nod approvingly to whatever it was he had said.
"Opposition then came from Minister for the ACT Gordon Bryant who charged that the PLO was not only at war with Israel but also at war with anyone who got in their way. He supported Beazley's argument that a visit by the PLO would stir up local tensions. He was not concerned about the electoral consequences, but although normally we would accept visits from both parties to a dispute, we had to remember that the PLO was at war with mankind.
"It was at this point that Don Willesee was brought into the debate for the second time. He had spoken only briefly when introducing his proposal. It was obvious now that he had changed his mind; and to me equally obvious that this is what he had whispered to Gough because he called Willesee even though he had already spoken once, and even though he had not asked for the call. He began by saying that he wanted the discussion kept within Ministerial circles until the dispute relating to Hartley and the PLO was known. He was not keen, he said, on the delegation coming to Australia. A report had been received through Peking suggesting that it might be preferable to defer the visit. He said it was a very difficult situation and he 'now' believed that we should tell them not to come at this time.'
"It was indeed a very difficult situation for Willesee! There were elements within his own Department who had counselled against the visit. His own Prime Minister had switched sides after hearing Wheeldon and Beazley. But Willesee came from the same state as the chief Ministerial protagonists for the Jewish cause. Don liked all three, and had a very deep personal respect for them and an admiration for their intellect. By an intelligent count of heads he could tell that the voting would be extremely close and he just didn't want his vote to result in a one vote win for all the things that Beazley and Wheeldon had warned against. If Cabinet was going to split down the centre he was not prepared to take any risks!
"Faced with what seemed the certain defeat of the original proposal to accept all the delegates, everyone accepted the view that the one vetoed by West Germany should be excluded. I sought to salvage something from the wreck by proposing an amendment that would admit the two who had been accepted by the United Nations General Assembly. There seemed to be no reason why anyone could object to them, and our acceptance would show that we were not taking sides. But the vote showed I had badly misjudged the mood of Cabinet, for it was only Whitlam's vote that saved Beazley's amendment from being lost, and the votes of Whitlam and Willesee that prevented my amendment from being carried.
"Gough had insisted on treating Beazley's opposition as an amendment to the motion to admit the four delegates. It probably didn't matter much because the die had been cast; but it was, of course, contrary to all the rules of debate to accept an amendment that was a direct negative of the motion. He apparently believed there was some technical advantage in doing this whereas, in fact, it was a disadvantage; because an even vote would have meant its defeat and the same rule would have applied if a vote were taken on the motion. In fact, it was this that forced Gough to vote in the show of hands I demanded. He frequently abstained from voting on issues whenever his own vote would make no difference to the outcome. So, when he declared the so-called amendment carried on the voices, I immediately called for a show of hands. Gough correctly guessed my motive but when only 9 of the 18 Ministers put up their hands in support of Beazley's amendment he was forced to show his own or see it defeated. So the amendment was declared carried by 10 votes to 8. Bowen had voted against the amendment and Morrison for it, but as the meeting was almost finished, and before my motion could be put, Morrison and Bowen tacitly paired by leaving the Cabinet meeting together. My motion was then put and declared lost on the voices which was confirmed on a show of hands, 7 for and 9 against, with Gough voting against giving entry visas even to the two delegates who had been given credentials to UNGA."
"It was a splendid defence of our position and had a vote been taken straight after Murphy's speech we would have won! I was now quite confident of winning, but I was not to know that Willesee would follow Whitlam and ask Cabinet to reject his own proposition. I half suspected that something was amiss because Willesee had leaned over to whisper something to Whitlam which caused him to nod approvingly to whatever it was he had said.
"Opposition then came from Minister for the ACT Gordon Bryant who charged that the PLO was not only at war with Israel but also at war with anyone who got in their way. He supported Beazley's argument that a visit by the PLO would stir up local tensions. He was not concerned about the electoral consequences, but although normally we would accept visits from both parties to a dispute, we had to remember that the PLO was at war with mankind.
"It was at this point that Don Willesee was brought into the debate for the second time. He had spoken only briefly when introducing his proposal. It was obvious now that he had changed his mind; and to me equally obvious that this is what he had whispered to Gough because he called Willesee even though he had already spoken once, and even though he had not asked for the call. He began by saying that he wanted the discussion kept within Ministerial circles until the dispute relating to Hartley and the PLO was known. He was not keen, he said, on the delegation coming to Australia. A report had been received through Peking suggesting that it might be preferable to defer the visit. He said it was a very difficult situation and he 'now' believed that we should tell them not to come at this time.'
"It was indeed a very difficult situation for Willesee! There were elements within his own Department who had counselled against the visit. His own Prime Minister had switched sides after hearing Wheeldon and Beazley. But Willesee came from the same state as the chief Ministerial protagonists for the Jewish cause. Don liked all three, and had a very deep personal respect for them and an admiration for their intellect. By an intelligent count of heads he could tell that the voting would be extremely close and he just didn't want his vote to result in a one vote win for all the things that Beazley and Wheeldon had warned against. If Cabinet was going to split down the centre he was not prepared to take any risks!
"Faced with what seemed the certain defeat of the original proposal to accept all the delegates, everyone accepted the view that the one vetoed by West Germany should be excluded. I sought to salvage something from the wreck by proposing an amendment that would admit the two who had been accepted by the United Nations General Assembly. There seemed to be no reason why anyone could object to them, and our acceptance would show that we were not taking sides. But the vote showed I had badly misjudged the mood of Cabinet, for it was only Whitlam's vote that saved Beazley's amendment from being lost, and the votes of Whitlam and Willesee that prevented my amendment from being carried.
"Gough had insisted on treating Beazley's opposition as an amendment to the motion to admit the four delegates. It probably didn't matter much because the die had been cast; but it was, of course, contrary to all the rules of debate to accept an amendment that was a direct negative of the motion. He apparently believed there was some technical advantage in doing this whereas, in fact, it was a disadvantage; because an even vote would have meant its defeat and the same rule would have applied if a vote were taken on the motion. In fact, it was this that forced Gough to vote in the show of hands I demanded. He frequently abstained from voting on issues whenever his own vote would make no difference to the outcome. So, when he declared the so-called amendment carried on the voices, I immediately called for a show of hands. Gough correctly guessed my motive but when only 9 of the 18 Ministers put up their hands in support of Beazley's amendment he was forced to show his own or see it defeated. So the amendment was declared carried by 10 votes to 8. Bowen had voted against the amendment and Morrison for it, but as the meeting was almost finished, and before my motion could be put, Morrison and Bowen tacitly paired by leaving the Cabinet meeting together. My motion was then put and declared lost on the voices which was confirmed on a show of hands, 7 for and 9 against, with Gough voting against giving entry visas even to the two delegates who had been given credentials to UNGA."
Thursday, October 23, 2014
Gough Whitlam: To PLO or Not to PLO 2
"Lionel Bowen appeared to sense that Gough was about to somersault and that Willesee and I were going to be left high and dry, so he took the point that the matter should never have been brought to Cabinet and ought to be left to the Minister for Labor and Immigration. He said, 'Clyde has already said that he is willing to let them in. We should do that if he wants to.' But Gough, no doubt realising that the issue had already gone too far and that it was therefore too late to sweep it under my carpet, reminded Cabinet that both Willesee and I had sought Cabinet's guidance because we feared the consequences of a decision taken either way. There were enough 'hear, hears' around the room to convince Bowen that a decision could not be avoided so he did not persist with his point.
"Bill Hayden took the line I had expected. He said that he would be disappointed if Cabinet decided not to issue the visas. Israel, he said, had been successful in getting its story across in Australia and other countries and the Arabs had been equally unsuccessful. To talk about the PLO threatening the boundaries of Israel, he said, was sheer nonsense because there were no internationally acceptable boundaries of Israel. He argued that the Arabs had been treated quite badly, but as they were accepted into society they would become more responsible. But responsibility, he said, could not be expected from them while the world treated them as terrorists and outlaws. 'We shouldn't play for teams; and so to deny the delegation the right to even put their case would be establishing an unhappy principle.' The Government, he declared, shouldn't allow emotions to overshadow the real issue.
"I had been waiting for Beazley to come into the debate because I wanted to reply to him as I knew his contribution would be a telling one. I had expected him to speak earlier, but apparently he was well satisfied with Wheeldon's contribution. However, Hayden's argument was too persuasive to ignore and Beazley immediately followed. He agreed with Hayden about the emotional issues involved, but took another view. It was not opportune for the PLO to come to Australia now, he argued; neither would he accept a delegation from the IRA while they were responsible for bombings in the UK. 'I mean,' he said, 'that I wouldn't accept IRA supporters as representatives of the IRA while they are planting bombs in London.' For these reasons he was against any of the delegation members being permitted to enter Australia.
"Beazley's speeches were always good, but coming after Wheeldon's, this was something of an anticlimax. It fell far short of what I had expected. But I could tell from Gough's affirmative 'head-nodding' that he had already decided to switch. He was beginning to see the political consequences of his original stance. Joe Riordan was heavily dependent upon Jewish support in his elctorate of Phillip. Joe Berinson was an influential backbencher and shared with Riordan the distinction of being the most powerful backbench debater in Caucus. And there were other reasons: not the least of which of which was the financial backing given to the Leader's fund by Jewish sources. And, in any event, if the decision went against the Arabs, Cabinet anonymity would guarantee that no one would question the reasonable assumption that Gough had been over-ruled.
"I followed Beazley and told Cabinet we would be doing ourselves less than justice if we debated the question in a climate of heat. We ought to look at the question calmly and make an objective assessment of the real issues and reach a rational conclusion. I said that it was not history that was important, but whether we adopted a correct national approach to the principles involved. This called for a sensible and rational understanding of what was being proposed. 'I will clear the visas,' I declared, 'unless Willesee says 'No', and providing they are cleared of any suspicions of being involved in terrorist activities.' I reminded Cabinet of the decision taken on 15 October 1973 in response to a motion put on the notice paper by DLP Senator Kane concerning the Middle East war when it was agreed by the Government that there should be no departure from its neutral and even-handed policy in the Middle East. The government, I said, should not be taking sides in the Middle East dispute and should not be seen to be taking sides either. 'The PLO is fighting a war! War itself is terrorism,' I argued. However, I said I would be prepared to support a deferment of the matter if that would solve anything. 'But deferment would not solve this issue,' I went on, 'we must take it head-on and face the political consequences whatever they may be. If the PLO comes here, the Government will lose votes and we ought to recognise this, but we must not submit to blackmail from any group.'
"For the third time Gough came into the debate. This time, he began ambivalently. He said that he had been put in a non-partisan stance. Freedom of entry and the right of the PLO to be heard were something we ought to support, he said, but lamented the fact that the granting of visas would not get the government any votes. He said he was worried! 'The PLO,' he confided, 'had approached us through diplomatic channels and we put them off.' They are aware that Hartley is not supported by the Government. This was a clever tactic because he knew that most of his Ministers shared his dislike for Hartley. However, only two or three were swayed by their hostility to Hartley. Gough said he recognised that the Palestinians were entitled to have a country of their own 'but if we take Beazley's point, it will exacerbate feelings within the Australian community to allow entry to a delegation from the PLO. However, if we refuse them entry we would also have to deny entry to Zionist groups.' He argued that all PLO members were not terrorists and that Israel was just as intransigent as the PLO. He concluded: 'Although it may be against our principles, I feel we ought to advise the Ministers not to issue visas. These representatives can't tell us anything we don't already know.'
"Once again, Gough had caved in under pressure. He was afraid of the political, rather than the electoral, consequences of standing by proper principles. I was the one who would have been forced to accept the odium for the decision and it made me angry that after leading us to believe he supported our line, he should leave us holding the bag. Even so, I still thought there was a good chance we could win, but I was determined that if we were defeated on the voices I would call for a show of hands and thus force Gough to register a recorded vote."
To be continued...
"Bill Hayden took the line I had expected. He said that he would be disappointed if Cabinet decided not to issue the visas. Israel, he said, had been successful in getting its story across in Australia and other countries and the Arabs had been equally unsuccessful. To talk about the PLO threatening the boundaries of Israel, he said, was sheer nonsense because there were no internationally acceptable boundaries of Israel. He argued that the Arabs had been treated quite badly, but as they were accepted into society they would become more responsible. But responsibility, he said, could not be expected from them while the world treated them as terrorists and outlaws. 'We shouldn't play for teams; and so to deny the delegation the right to even put their case would be establishing an unhappy principle.' The Government, he declared, shouldn't allow emotions to overshadow the real issue.
"I had been waiting for Beazley to come into the debate because I wanted to reply to him as I knew his contribution would be a telling one. I had expected him to speak earlier, but apparently he was well satisfied with Wheeldon's contribution. However, Hayden's argument was too persuasive to ignore and Beazley immediately followed. He agreed with Hayden about the emotional issues involved, but took another view. It was not opportune for the PLO to come to Australia now, he argued; neither would he accept a delegation from the IRA while they were responsible for bombings in the UK. 'I mean,' he said, 'that I wouldn't accept IRA supporters as representatives of the IRA while they are planting bombs in London.' For these reasons he was against any of the delegation members being permitted to enter Australia.
"Beazley's speeches were always good, but coming after Wheeldon's, this was something of an anticlimax. It fell far short of what I had expected. But I could tell from Gough's affirmative 'head-nodding' that he had already decided to switch. He was beginning to see the political consequences of his original stance. Joe Riordan was heavily dependent upon Jewish support in his elctorate of Phillip. Joe Berinson was an influential backbencher and shared with Riordan the distinction of being the most powerful backbench debater in Caucus. And there were other reasons: not the least of which of which was the financial backing given to the Leader's fund by Jewish sources. And, in any event, if the decision went against the Arabs, Cabinet anonymity would guarantee that no one would question the reasonable assumption that Gough had been over-ruled.
"I followed Beazley and told Cabinet we would be doing ourselves less than justice if we debated the question in a climate of heat. We ought to look at the question calmly and make an objective assessment of the real issues and reach a rational conclusion. I said that it was not history that was important, but whether we adopted a correct national approach to the principles involved. This called for a sensible and rational understanding of what was being proposed. 'I will clear the visas,' I declared, 'unless Willesee says 'No', and providing they are cleared of any suspicions of being involved in terrorist activities.' I reminded Cabinet of the decision taken on 15 October 1973 in response to a motion put on the notice paper by DLP Senator Kane concerning the Middle East war when it was agreed by the Government that there should be no departure from its neutral and even-handed policy in the Middle East. The government, I said, should not be taking sides in the Middle East dispute and should not be seen to be taking sides either. 'The PLO is fighting a war! War itself is terrorism,' I argued. However, I said I would be prepared to support a deferment of the matter if that would solve anything. 'But deferment would not solve this issue,' I went on, 'we must take it head-on and face the political consequences whatever they may be. If the PLO comes here, the Government will lose votes and we ought to recognise this, but we must not submit to blackmail from any group.'
"For the third time Gough came into the debate. This time, he began ambivalently. He said that he had been put in a non-partisan stance. Freedom of entry and the right of the PLO to be heard were something we ought to support, he said, but lamented the fact that the granting of visas would not get the government any votes. He said he was worried! 'The PLO,' he confided, 'had approached us through diplomatic channels and we put them off.' They are aware that Hartley is not supported by the Government. This was a clever tactic because he knew that most of his Ministers shared his dislike for Hartley. However, only two or three were swayed by their hostility to Hartley. Gough said he recognised that the Palestinians were entitled to have a country of their own 'but if we take Beazley's point, it will exacerbate feelings within the Australian community to allow entry to a delegation from the PLO. However, if we refuse them entry we would also have to deny entry to Zionist groups.' He argued that all PLO members were not terrorists and that Israel was just as intransigent as the PLO. He concluded: 'Although it may be against our principles, I feel we ought to advise the Ministers not to issue visas. These representatives can't tell us anything we don't already know.'
"Once again, Gough had caved in under pressure. He was afraid of the political, rather than the electoral, consequences of standing by proper principles. I was the one who would have been forced to accept the odium for the decision and it made me angry that after leading us to believe he supported our line, he should leave us holding the bag. Even so, I still thought there was a good chance we could win, but I was determined that if we were defeated on the voices I would call for a show of hands and thus force Gough to register a recorded vote."
To be continued...
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
Gough Whitlam: To PLO or Not to PLO 1
Vale Gough Whitlam (1916-2014). With respect to the Middle East conflict, we've all heard about his Labor government's (1972-75) so-called 'even-handed' Palestine/Israel policy. But what did it look like in practice, and just who in the Whitlam government was doing what (and why) for Israel at the time?
What follows is an edited extract, over three consecutive posts, from then Labour & Immigration Minister Clyde Cameron's The Cameron Diaries (1990), pages 35-40:
"The matter came before Cabinet on 29 January 1975... via Senator Willesee, who proposed that four members of the [Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)] delegation be granted entry visas...
"Gough opened the debate in support of visas being issued to all members with the exception of one who was suspected by the West German Government of being involved in the massacre of Israeli athletes attending the Olympic Games in Munich... He referred to the Party's platform and to the need to maintain an even-handed policy in the Middle East. In fact, Gough had made such a powerful and persuasive case that I felt it was unnecessary to speak. Willesee, who had already been assured of Gough's support, shared my belief that the proposal would be endorsed notwithstanding the opposition we knew would come from Kim Beazley. So, he contented himself with a brief, almost casual, outline of his proposition.
"But then Senator John Wheeldon charged into the debate with a spirited and at times bitter denunciation of Gough's argument. He accused Gough of inconsistency in that he had issued instructions against granting even transit visas to South African sporting teams en route to New Zealand and on the grounds that South Africa was practising apartheid. The PLO, he taunted, were not prepared to even recognise the right of Israel to exist. In no circumstances, declared Wheeldon, should the Australian Government issue visas to PLO representatives as such. To do so, he argued, would lead to the inescapable fact that that we were granting official recognition to Arab terrorist organisations. The PLO, he said, had openly boasted of their terrorist activities and had publicly and specifically refused to disclaim that their goal was the destruction of the state of Israel.
"Wheeldon asserted that if the PLO were allowed entry to Australia they would most certainly engage in pressure tactics here. Indeed, he continued, they are already doing this from the PLO office in Melbourne which operates under the spiritual guidance and camouflage provided by Bill Hartley [of the Victorian Socialist Left]. No other government, he claimed, had received PLO delegates; and we would be guilty of splitting principles and of gross hypocrisy if we granted entry visas to a delegation representing the PLO. Moreover, it would be highly damaging electorally to the Party and to the Government.
"Wheeldon's outburst caught me by surprise. It caught Gough too! We knew that Kim Beazley had often expressed his opposition to the PLO and to Hartley's involvement in their cause. But hardly anyone had been prepared for Wheeldon's emotive blast. And yet, upon reflection, I should not have been surprised because he had often echoed Beazley's sentiments about Hartley. Moreover, it was well known that he was very close to Joe Berinson, the highly respected and very talented Jewish Labor Member for the Division of Perth.
"Berinson, a qualified pharmacist who had later won a law degree, was dedicated to the cause of Israel. Beazley had been influenced by his brilliant intellect, and it had now become evident Wheeldon had come under his spell as well.
"As soon as Wheeldon finished, I knew that one or two Ministers might have doubts about the advisability of granting the request, but with Whitlam, Willesee and me supporting the proposal I had little doubt it would be carried. Lionel Murphy, Rex Connor and Bill Hayden too, had on previous occasions indicated their support for an even-handed policy for the Middle East. However, to my surprise, Gough began to back and fill, and as soon as Wheeldon finished, he again entered the debate to say that he had received a note from Al Grassby, Special Consultant to Murphy on Community Relations, to the effect that the delegation may not come even if it were approved. I began to wonder whether under the ferocity of Wheeldon's attack Gough was going to water."
To be continued...
What follows is an edited extract, over three consecutive posts, from then Labour & Immigration Minister Clyde Cameron's The Cameron Diaries (1990), pages 35-40:
"The matter came before Cabinet on 29 January 1975... via Senator Willesee, who proposed that four members of the [Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)] delegation be granted entry visas...
"Gough opened the debate in support of visas being issued to all members with the exception of one who was suspected by the West German Government of being involved in the massacre of Israeli athletes attending the Olympic Games in Munich... He referred to the Party's platform and to the need to maintain an even-handed policy in the Middle East. In fact, Gough had made such a powerful and persuasive case that I felt it was unnecessary to speak. Willesee, who had already been assured of Gough's support, shared my belief that the proposal would be endorsed notwithstanding the opposition we knew would come from Kim Beazley. So, he contented himself with a brief, almost casual, outline of his proposition.
"But then Senator John Wheeldon charged into the debate with a spirited and at times bitter denunciation of Gough's argument. He accused Gough of inconsistency in that he had issued instructions against granting even transit visas to South African sporting teams en route to New Zealand and on the grounds that South Africa was practising apartheid. The PLO, he taunted, were not prepared to even recognise the right of Israel to exist. In no circumstances, declared Wheeldon, should the Australian Government issue visas to PLO representatives as such. To do so, he argued, would lead to the inescapable fact that that we were granting official recognition to Arab terrorist organisations. The PLO, he said, had openly boasted of their terrorist activities and had publicly and specifically refused to disclaim that their goal was the destruction of the state of Israel.
"Wheeldon asserted that if the PLO were allowed entry to Australia they would most certainly engage in pressure tactics here. Indeed, he continued, they are already doing this from the PLO office in Melbourne which operates under the spiritual guidance and camouflage provided by Bill Hartley [of the Victorian Socialist Left]. No other government, he claimed, had received PLO delegates; and we would be guilty of splitting principles and of gross hypocrisy if we granted entry visas to a delegation representing the PLO. Moreover, it would be highly damaging electorally to the Party and to the Government.
"Wheeldon's outburst caught me by surprise. It caught Gough too! We knew that Kim Beazley had often expressed his opposition to the PLO and to Hartley's involvement in their cause. But hardly anyone had been prepared for Wheeldon's emotive blast. And yet, upon reflection, I should not have been surprised because he had often echoed Beazley's sentiments about Hartley. Moreover, it was well known that he was very close to Joe Berinson, the highly respected and very talented Jewish Labor Member for the Division of Perth.
"Berinson, a qualified pharmacist who had later won a law degree, was dedicated to the cause of Israel. Beazley had been influenced by his brilliant intellect, and it had now become evident Wheeldon had come under his spell as well.
"As soon as Wheeldon finished, I knew that one or two Ministers might have doubts about the advisability of granting the request, but with Whitlam, Willesee and me supporting the proposal I had little doubt it would be carried. Lionel Murphy, Rex Connor and Bill Hayden too, had on previous occasions indicated their support for an even-handed policy for the Middle East. However, to my surprise, Gough began to back and fill, and as soon as Wheeldon finished, he again entered the debate to say that he had received a note from Al Grassby, Special Consultant to Murphy on Community Relations, to the effect that the delegation may not come even if it were approved. I began to wonder whether under the ferocity of Wheeldon's attack Gough was going to water."
To be continued...
Thursday, May 8, 2014
Viva Australian Student Activism 2
Continued from my previous post:
"1975
"The 1975 resolutions [passed at AUS's January 1975 Council] were far clearer in their formulation [than the 1974 resolutions]...
[MERC: These were 1) AUS supports the establishment of a democratic secular State of Palestine (encompassing the area of mandate territory) wherein all people presently residing in Israel and all Palestinian Arabs forcibly exiled from their homeland will have the right to Palestinian citizenship. This motion embodies the right of Palestinian citizens of all religions, race, colour, creed and sex to the protection of the new State and rejects racist legislation, such as the present Zionist 'Law of Return'. 2) AUS concurs with UN Resolution 3236 (XXIX) and the decision of the UN to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 3) To counter the present media bias, AUS should continue to use its resources to publicise to both students and the general community the plight and continuing oppression of the Palestinian people by both Israeli and Arab nations.]
"As Simon Marginson has pointed out in his paper on the subject in Alternate News Service (No 43, August 4, 1975) the debate in 1975 showed a marked unity and turn to the right in Zionist arguments.
"THE GUPS TOUR
"Nowhere was this turn more evident than in response to the tour by a delegation of two members of the General Union of Palestinian Students in May 1975. At [AUS's] August 1974 Council there was an unanimous vote in favour of the motion: 'That AUS invite a representative of GUPS to do a speaking tour of campuses early in 1975 in order that membership can directly seek clarification of various aspects the Palestinian question.' Shortly afterwards, the then President [of AUS] Neil McLean wrote to GUPS in Cairo issuing an invitation. No reply had been received by Annual Council 1975, and in February Ian McDonald, the new president, issued another invitation. The invitation was delivered verbally by FCC Rodd Webb during a visit to Damascus that month and was accepted and publicised with little reaction.
"Meanwhile the question of allowing a PLO delegation into Australia had become a matter of public controversy. In January 1975, the Prime Minister [Gough Whitlam] had decided not to issue visas to a group of PLO members. This controversy, and the ALP's vacillation over the question, must be dealt with in another place. It is only relevant [in so far as it relates to] the question of the GUPS delegation and the public reaction of AUJS to its visit. The Labor Government, having satisfied itself that the GUPS delegation would not be representing the PLO, issued visas to Eddie Zananiri and Samir Cheikh who duly arrived in Melbourne on May 4, 1975.
"The public controversy in 1974 to the AUS stance paled in comparison to the storm which greeted the arrival of the GUPS delegation. A demonstration by right-wing Zionists outside AUS [headquarters] degenerated into a brawl when some Arab and Australian supporters of the tour diverted a small section of a May Day march to AUS under the impression that the GUPS delegation was under siege. The next day [Opposition Leader Malcolm] Fraser launched an attack against the tour in parliament while daily newspapers and television reported, editorialised [on], and once again scrutinised AUS' activity.
"The tour was eventful and well attended and received by the majority of students. Hundreds, and in some cases, thousands of students turned up to hear Zananiri and Cheikh. However, the speakers were frequently heckled and drowned out by Zionist demonstrators. At the first public campus meeting at Melbourne University, AUJS president Joe Gersh had to appeal to his supporters not to incite violence and held an alternate demonstration in front of the [AUS] building [in Carlton] as the Palestinian speakers were on the other side. Marshals at the Jewish demonstration were extremely anxious that some of their more extreme elements (there were reportedly several ex-Israeli soldiers in the crowd) would become violent. Unfortunately, very little of Zananiri's or Cheikh's speeches was actually heard. Both were drowned out completely, despite an effective PA system, by the constant rival chants of the Zionists and pro-Palestinians. (Imre Salusinszky, Nation Review, May 9-15, 1975)
"On May 7, The Australian reported that one of the leading Zionists at Melbourne University, Michael Danby, had resigned his position as AUS secretary on that campus in protest over the visit. A few days later Danby's resignation was reported in The Australian Jewish News because of: '... the fascist, racist actions and attitudes taken by AUS towards Jews and the scandalous abuse of AUS resources.'
"AUJS opposition to the GUPS tour was confused and contradictory. There had been no opposition at all at August 1974 Council; indeed, prominent members of AUJS had supported the tour (Arena, 21/5/75). At January Council [1975], AUJS members had also voted for a resolution condemning the Australian government's decision to ban the PLO tour. Days before the [GUPS] delegation arrived, AUJS condemned the tour and Joe Gersh declined an offer to debate the Palestinians when they arrived. Yet, within two days, Gersh demanded equal time on the platform with the delegation, a theme which repeated itself throughout the interruptions at public meetings. (There was eventually a debate on Monday Conference between Zananiri and Peter Wise).
"In [a] telegram to various ministers in the government, AUJS demanded the immediate deportation of the delegation, pointing out that under the Commonwealth Crimes Act anyone dedicated to the overthrow of an established government could immediately be deported (Australian Jewish Times, 8/5/75). To substantiate this demand AUJS attempted to draw links between GUPS and the PLO."
To be concluded next post...
"1975
"The 1975 resolutions [passed at AUS's January 1975 Council] were far clearer in their formulation [than the 1974 resolutions]...
[MERC: These were 1) AUS supports the establishment of a democratic secular State of Palestine (encompassing the area of mandate territory) wherein all people presently residing in Israel and all Palestinian Arabs forcibly exiled from their homeland will have the right to Palestinian citizenship. This motion embodies the right of Palestinian citizens of all religions, race, colour, creed and sex to the protection of the new State and rejects racist legislation, such as the present Zionist 'Law of Return'. 2) AUS concurs with UN Resolution 3236 (XXIX) and the decision of the UN to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 3) To counter the present media bias, AUS should continue to use its resources to publicise to both students and the general community the plight and continuing oppression of the Palestinian people by both Israeli and Arab nations.]
"As Simon Marginson has pointed out in his paper on the subject in Alternate News Service (No 43, August 4, 1975) the debate in 1975 showed a marked unity and turn to the right in Zionist arguments.
"THE GUPS TOUR
"Nowhere was this turn more evident than in response to the tour by a delegation of two members of the General Union of Palestinian Students in May 1975. At [AUS's] August 1974 Council there was an unanimous vote in favour of the motion: 'That AUS invite a representative of GUPS to do a speaking tour of campuses early in 1975 in order that membership can directly seek clarification of various aspects the Palestinian question.' Shortly afterwards, the then President [of AUS] Neil McLean wrote to GUPS in Cairo issuing an invitation. No reply had been received by Annual Council 1975, and in February Ian McDonald, the new president, issued another invitation. The invitation was delivered verbally by FCC Rodd Webb during a visit to Damascus that month and was accepted and publicised with little reaction.
"Meanwhile the question of allowing a PLO delegation into Australia had become a matter of public controversy. In January 1975, the Prime Minister [Gough Whitlam] had decided not to issue visas to a group of PLO members. This controversy, and the ALP's vacillation over the question, must be dealt with in another place. It is only relevant [in so far as it relates to] the question of the GUPS delegation and the public reaction of AUJS to its visit. The Labor Government, having satisfied itself that the GUPS delegation would not be representing the PLO, issued visas to Eddie Zananiri and Samir Cheikh who duly arrived in Melbourne on May 4, 1975.
"The public controversy in 1974 to the AUS stance paled in comparison to the storm which greeted the arrival of the GUPS delegation. A demonstration by right-wing Zionists outside AUS [headquarters] degenerated into a brawl when some Arab and Australian supporters of the tour diverted a small section of a May Day march to AUS under the impression that the GUPS delegation was under siege. The next day [Opposition Leader Malcolm] Fraser launched an attack against the tour in parliament while daily newspapers and television reported, editorialised [on], and once again scrutinised AUS' activity.
"The tour was eventful and well attended and received by the majority of students. Hundreds, and in some cases, thousands of students turned up to hear Zananiri and Cheikh. However, the speakers were frequently heckled and drowned out by Zionist demonstrators. At the first public campus meeting at Melbourne University, AUJS president Joe Gersh had to appeal to his supporters not to incite violence and held an alternate demonstration in front of the [AUS] building [in Carlton] as the Palestinian speakers were on the other side. Marshals at the Jewish demonstration were extremely anxious that some of their more extreme elements (there were reportedly several ex-Israeli soldiers in the crowd) would become violent. Unfortunately, very little of Zananiri's or Cheikh's speeches was actually heard. Both were drowned out completely, despite an effective PA system, by the constant rival chants of the Zionists and pro-Palestinians. (Imre Salusinszky, Nation Review, May 9-15, 1975)
"On May 7, The Australian reported that one of the leading Zionists at Melbourne University, Michael Danby, had resigned his position as AUS secretary on that campus in protest over the visit. A few days later Danby's resignation was reported in The Australian Jewish News because of: '... the fascist, racist actions and attitudes taken by AUS towards Jews and the scandalous abuse of AUS resources.'
"AUJS opposition to the GUPS tour was confused and contradictory. There had been no opposition at all at August 1974 Council; indeed, prominent members of AUJS had supported the tour (Arena, 21/5/75). At January Council [1975], AUJS members had also voted for a resolution condemning the Australian government's decision to ban the PLO tour. Days before the [GUPS] delegation arrived, AUJS condemned the tour and Joe Gersh declined an offer to debate the Palestinians when they arrived. Yet, within two days, Gersh demanded equal time on the platform with the delegation, a theme which repeated itself throughout the interruptions at public meetings. (There was eventually a debate on Monday Conference between Zananiri and Peter Wise).
"In [a] telegram to various ministers in the government, AUJS demanded the immediate deportation of the delegation, pointing out that under the Commonwealth Crimes Act anyone dedicated to the overthrow of an established government could immediately be deported (Australian Jewish Times, 8/5/75). To substantiate this demand AUJS attempted to draw links between GUPS and the PLO."
To be concluded next post...
Monday, June 3, 2013
We Want Gough!
Last night I watched the second of the 2-part ABC documentary, Whitlam: The Power & the Passion, on the prime ministerial career of Labor's Gough Whitlam (1972-1975).
What an inspiration the man was! Back then, the Australian Labor Party was truly the embodiment of Chifley's 'light on the hill'.
The following assessment of Whitlam, by one of his colleagues, sums up the man and the era beautifully:
"Yesterday's Canberra Times [1/1/76] carries an interesting letter which begins by saying that Gough Whitlam's early sponsors 'saw him merely as a shallow lawyer who would charm sufficient middle-class voters to put the Labor Party in office'. Instead, the letter continues, they unleashed a genuine radical who released imprisoned conscientious objectors, spent more money on education, introduced free legal aid, showed a concern for the aboriginal people and for human rights.
"Gough was indeed a radical; he probably had a deeper commitment to Socialism than Evatt, Forde, Scullin, Hughes, Charlton, Tudor, Fisher or Watson. The only Federal Leaders who had Whitlam's commitment to social change were Calwell, Chifley and Curtin. Socialism, Gough once explained, was about the quality of life. Wages and conditions, he said, were no longer the chief determinants of real living standards. What really mattered, he argued, was 'the social capital a country can offer its people in the form of health, housing and education'.
"Soon after his election as Leader he made a declaration of faith in Socialism which went beyond anything even Curtin, Chifley or Calwell would have said after they became Leaders. He declared: 'There never was an age when Socialism was so nearly inevitable, there never was a country where it was so necessary... Public ownership and public control of the economy are more than ever central to the Labor programme for Government'." (The Cameron Diaries, Clyde Cameron, 1990, pp 3-4)
But how is the party of the great Gough Whitlam faring these days? Is Chifley's 'light on the hill' still burning?
For answer, one need look no further than the opening paragraph of a short report in the May 24 issue of The Australian Jewish News. This one-sentence 'snapshot' speaks volumes about the current state of the party, managing to capture - as only a 'picture' can - both the essence and extent of its political vision, and, tellingly, the size of its membership base:
"Members of the Young Labor Women's Network showed their love of chocolate and their support for Israel and the Jewish community earlier this month by holding a meeting at Max Brenner in Parramatta." (Chocolate beats BDS for Labor's young women)
What an inspiration the man was! Back then, the Australian Labor Party was truly the embodiment of Chifley's 'light on the hill'.
The following assessment of Whitlam, by one of his colleagues, sums up the man and the era beautifully:
"Yesterday's Canberra Times [1/1/76] carries an interesting letter which begins by saying that Gough Whitlam's early sponsors 'saw him merely as a shallow lawyer who would charm sufficient middle-class voters to put the Labor Party in office'. Instead, the letter continues, they unleashed a genuine radical who released imprisoned conscientious objectors, spent more money on education, introduced free legal aid, showed a concern for the aboriginal people and for human rights.
"Gough was indeed a radical; he probably had a deeper commitment to Socialism than Evatt, Forde, Scullin, Hughes, Charlton, Tudor, Fisher or Watson. The only Federal Leaders who had Whitlam's commitment to social change were Calwell, Chifley and Curtin. Socialism, Gough once explained, was about the quality of life. Wages and conditions, he said, were no longer the chief determinants of real living standards. What really mattered, he argued, was 'the social capital a country can offer its people in the form of health, housing and education'.
"Soon after his election as Leader he made a declaration of faith in Socialism which went beyond anything even Curtin, Chifley or Calwell would have said after they became Leaders. He declared: 'There never was an age when Socialism was so nearly inevitable, there never was a country where it was so necessary... Public ownership and public control of the economy are more than ever central to the Labor programme for Government'." (The Cameron Diaries, Clyde Cameron, 1990, pp 3-4)
But how is the party of the great Gough Whitlam faring these days? Is Chifley's 'light on the hill' still burning?
For answer, one need look no further than the opening paragraph of a short report in the May 24 issue of The Australian Jewish News. This one-sentence 'snapshot' speaks volumes about the current state of the party, managing to capture - as only a 'picture' can - both the essence and extent of its political vision, and, tellingly, the size of its membership base:
"Members of the Young Labor Women's Network showed their love of chocolate and their support for Israel and the Jewish community earlier this month by holding a meeting at Max Brenner in Parramatta." (Chocolate beats BDS for Labor's young women)
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